Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis by Fourcade, Marion et al.
HAL Id: hal-02393514
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02393514
Submitted on 4 Dec 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis
Marion Fourcade, Philippe Steiner, Wolfgang Streeck, Cornelia Woll
To cite this version:
Marion Fourcade, Philippe Steiner, Wolfgang Streeck, Cornelia Woll. Moral Categories in the Finan-
cial Crisis. 2013. ￿hal-02393514￿
maxpo discussion paper
Moral Categories in the  
Financial Crisis
Marion Fourcade, Philippe Steiner,  
Wolfgang Streeck, and Cornelia Woll
No. 13/1
Marion Fourcade, Philippe Steiner, Wolfgang Streeck, and Cornelia Woll 
Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis
MaxPo Discussion Paper 13/1 
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies 
June 2013
MaxPo Discussion Paper 
ISSN 2196-6508 (Print) 
© 2013 by the author(s)
Marion Fourcade and Cornelia Woll are codirectors at the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with 
Instability in Market Societies, Paris.
marion.fourcade@sciences-po.fr 
cornelia.woll@sciences-po.fr
Philippe Steiner is Professor of Sociology at the Paris-Sorbonne University and a member of the Institut 
Universitaire de France.
philippe.steiner@paris-sorbonne.fr
Wolfgang Streeck is director at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.
streeck@mpifg.de
Downloads
www.maxpo.eu
Go to Publications
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies
Sciences Po | 27 rue Saint-Guillaume | 75337 Paris Cedex 07 | France
Tel. +33 1 45 49 59 32
Fax +33 1 58 71 72 17
www.maxpo.eu
info@maxpo.eu
Fourcade, Steiner, Streeck, Woll: Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis iii
Abstract
Karl Marx observed long ago that all economic struggles invite moral struggles, or mas-
querade as such. The reverse may be true as well: deep moral-political conflicts may 
be waged through the manipulation of economic resources. Using the recent financial 
and Eurozone crises as empirical backgrounds, the four papers gathered here propose 
four different perspectives on the play of moral judgments in the economy, and call 
for broader and more systematic scholarly engagement with this issue. Focusing on 
executive compensation, bank bailouts, and the sovereign debt crisis, the symposium 
builds on a roundtable discussion held at the opening of the Max Planck Sciences Po 
Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 
29, 2012. 
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Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis
Introduction
Marion Fourcade and Cornelia Woll 1
The collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers investment bank on Septem-
ber 9, 2008 opened the black box of modern financial markets to the world. It exposed 
finance’s vast and complex machine, until then largely invisible to the wider public and 
poorly mastered by even its most skilled practitioners. With this event, the technical 
became political. Esoteric terms such as collateralized debt obligations, credit default 
swaps, haircuts, yield spreads and write-downs were catapulted to public fame. The 
obliviousness of regulatory institutions became a topic for dinner conversations.
The new forms of scrutiny also exposed finance as a social activity subject to consider-
able dishonesty and recklessness. Expert reflections about executive pay, bank rescues 
or sovereign debt default were laden with statements about good and bad incentives, 
moral hazard and loopholes. The public responded with categorical distinctions be-
tween the ruthless and the clueless, the corrupt and the honest, the lazy and the indus-
trious, the profligate and the frugal, the greedy and the rest, what is right and what is not. 
Vindicating Marx’s statement in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 
that “[political economy] is – for all its worldly and debauched appearance – a truly 
moral science, the most moral science of all” (2005: 361), such arguments continue 
to saturate specialist debates and political negotiations about the most appropriate re-
sponses to the banking and sovereign debt crises. Are financial executives really worthy 
of the outsized compensations they have enjoyed so far, or do enormous bonuses offend 
common decency (Steiner 2012)? Is there a just interest rate and is it ethical to protect 
the right of creditors to receive interest payments? Should some lending practices be 
described as predatory, and made illegal? Is it morally acceptable to bail out imprudent 
financial institutions using taxpayers’ money, when imprudent individual borrowers 
are left struggling? People’s sense of justice may be seriously hurt, as Swedberg (2013) 
points out. Is it fair to protect the holdings of foreign creditors (e.g., German and French 
banks, for the most part) while citizens suffer to repay? Does Greece deserve to be saved, 
given its government’s lies about the true state of its national debt? Does the fact that 
Cyprus is a money-laundering platform justify a harsher treatment of the population 
that supported, implicitly or explicitly, the island’s conversion into a fiscal paradise? Is 
it right that the European Central Bank – an unelected body – drastically varies its as-
sistance to Italy depending on the government in power there?
1 We are grateful to Gregory Jackson for comments on all the pieces in this discussion paper.  
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Competing visions of fairness, moral tolerability, and right and wrong courses of action 
are written all over economic struggles. Ordinary attitudes about the economy – for in-
stance, about the “market” or about poverty – mobilize socially and historically situated 
conceptions of justice or human nature, sometimes explicitly couched in religious or 
political terms (Steensland 2010; Steensland/Schrank 2011). To the extent that they are 
gendered beings with a distinctive history, a social position and a nationality, social sci-
entists are not immune from these collective forces (Bourdieu 1988). Notwithstanding 
the externality cherished by experts, policy struggles (including what to investigate and 
how, or the criteria by which to evaluate policy options) always imply political choices – 
that is, choices about the distribution of economic power in society. Thus, some schol-
ars (Lebaron 2000; Nelson 2001) have described economics, or its different intellectual 
currents (Keynesian, Chicagoan, Marxist …), as belief systems. As Alan Wolfe (1989: 6) 
put it, “even those social sciences that pride themselves on rigorous value neutrality, 
insisting that they are only describing how people do act, not advocating how they 
should, contain implicit (and often explicit) statements of what people’s obligations to 
one another should be.” But the point is not merely about the scholastic biases of dif-
ferent disciplines. It is much broader. Economies are shaped by the moral dispositions 
and beliefs of the individuals who govern them as much as they are governed through 
techniques and numbers (Lascoumes/Le Galès 2005). 
The current financial and economic crisis in Western economies offers many empirical 
sites for sharpening our theoretical frameworks in this direction. If this short sympo-
sium offers a programmatic call to recognize the relevance of moral judgments when 
analyzing economic processes, its more immediate objective is to analyze different ways 
in which moral categories have been mobilized in the financial and Eurozone crisis. We 
begin at the micro level, with individuals, and scale up gradually toward organizations, 
specific countries and interstate relations. 
In the first piece, Philippe Steiner analyzes the reconfiguration of the “moral economy” 
surrounding income inequalities in light of repeated revelations of outlandish execu-
tive pay in the French media and the consciousness-raising activities of the so-called 
“99 percent.” These events, Steiner suggests, have prompted a better grasp of the reality 
of income inequality (people continue to vastly underestimate the income of a CEO, 
but less so than they used to). But – and perhaps paradoxically, given the public outrage 
over these issues – their tolerance for income inequality has increased as well (in France, 
the desired inequality ratio between a worker’s wage and a CEO’s has jumped from 6.3 
in 1999 to 18 in 2010). 
Next, Cornelia Woll’s analysis of bank bailouts underlines the dilemma between the 
collective problem of systemic risk and the individual one of moral hazard. None of the 
solutions adopted to face the crisis has been able to solve both problems at once, she 
argues: to avoid systemic risk, governments have committed large amounts of public 
money to save the culprits of the financial mess, increasing the moral hazard problem. 
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Woll argues that we need to enhance the collective moral responsibility of the financial 
industry so that banks will be able to cooperate among themselves and participate in 
their own rescue as a group.
In the subsequent piece, Wolfgang Streeck offers a powerful indictment of the European 
Commission and financial elites in his interpretation of the unfolding of the Greek 
economic tragedy. European institutions actively encouraged the Greek credit binge, 
Streeck argues, first on the supply side (by lowering fiscal transfers to Greece and turn-
ing a blind eye when the country sharply cut its taxes) and then on the demand side, 
by indicating that Greece’s public debt was worth that of any other Eurozone member 
state (which caused financial markets to rush for Greek bonds). The notion that such ir-
responsible dealings would have to be erased through the pain and suffering of ordinary 
citizens (who, as democratic voters, are now held responsible for their governments’ 
disastrous choices) is deeply troubling, and a warning sign that Europe’s economic de-
signs may benefit no one but the most powerful. 
Finally, Marion Fourcade examines the cultural and political consequences of the eco-
nomic morality plays being acted in the corridors of Brussels and Washington. She re-
minds us that debt, whether contracted interpersonally or at the collective level between 
formally equal parties, is always a relationship of power, which establishes hierarchies 
in material resources and moral character. When one party struggles to fulfill its obli-
gations, moral regulation intensifies. She argues that Eurozone troubles are not only 
contributing to a rapid divergence in economic trajectories between North and South; 
they are also awakening old civilizational complexes, the cruelty of cultural stigma (as 
applied to entire populations), and the ghost of Europe’s violent past.
All too often, policy-makers and intellectuals delude themselves into believing that 
moral judgments can be safely separated from “objective” benchmarks of economic 
action; all too often, we take as given the idea that profit must be maximized (Beckert 
2006), or that debt must be repaid (Graeber 2011; Streeck, this issue). We fail to recog-
nize that these injunctions, like all economic processes and actions, are the outcome 
of contingent human struggles. We must recover our ability to see morality at work 
in economic processes: in other words, to better understand the moral and symbolic 
work that economic instruments and tools perform, and conversely, the economic work 
performed by moral categorizations. The political fights that have accompanied blame 
attributions and punishments (or lack thereof) for the crisis, the seemingly irreversible 
race for economic virtue among governments, the soul-searching of institutions such 
as the IMF, caught in their own contradictions, are powerful reminders that economic 
sociology and political economy have a lot to contribute to current economic debates. 
Showing the political implications of some recent morality plays across a range of do-
mains is the ambition of the symposium, which brings together a roundtable discussion 
held at the opening of the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in 
Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012.
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High wages in the financial crisis
Philippe Steiner
In this short piece, I will focus on the moral issue raised by the existence and persistence 
of high levels of remuneration – which President Barack Obama, in his 2010 State of the 
Union Address, called “obscene” – during a period of financial and economic crisis.  I do 
not intend to go beyond a mere description of this moral issue in the French context.1 
The present crisis is not only a crisis in both “real” and “virtual” economies; it is also a 
crisis in the moral dimension of prevailing economic opinion. This is particularly salient 
with regard to the distributional effects of the financialization of companies. Economic 
analysis argues that whatever happens in the production of goods, the marginal contri-
bution and the marginal remuneration of each participant should be equal. People are 
paid according to their contribution to production – no matter which way you measure 
the former, market forces are supposed to match the two faces of the issue.2 Huge pay-
ments, the argument goes, should not upset anybody, since they simply reflect the high 
level of contribution that the fortunate recipient has made to the production of wealth. 
If you add to this credo the use of so-called “incentive payments,” very large compensa-
tions are the fuel that is necessary for the realization of these high levels of contribu-
tion.  One may wonder whether economic science is a hard science, but nobody can cast 
doubt upon its status as a hard moral discourse when the distribution of wealth is at 
stake, as John Stuart Mill warned his readers by the middle of the nineteenth century.
This was all wrecked by the financial crash in September 2008.
By mid-September 2008, French newspapers were telling their readers day after day that 
at the top level of major firms – notably those which belong to the Standard and Poor’s 
500 or to its French equivalent, the so-called CAC 40 – there was a complete decoupling 
between performance and the size of remuneration packages (wage + bonuses + stock 
options + perks); this was particularly the case in the financial and banking sectors.
A sociologist interested in the sociology of markets and its moral underpinnings could 
then profit from the large amount of data offered by daily newspapers, in his effort to 
understand the moral reaction that later emerged in the form social movements, such 
as “Occupy Wall Street” with its famous motto “We are the 99 percent,” or the Europe-
wide movement known as Los indignados.
1 This piece is based on my last book, Les rémunérations obscènes (Steiner 2011). In that book I 
traced the moral dimension from a systematic content analysis of Le Monde, a major French na-
tional newspaper, and Sud-Ouest, a regional one. Here, I will limit myself to the first newspaper. 
2 There is a large literature on the contribution/remuneration dimension of managers’ activity 
since the rise of financial capitalism: see, for example, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Murphy (1999), 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Gabaix and Landier (2008).
6 MaxPo Discussion Paper 13/1
What picture emerged from reading newspapers between September 2008 and June 2010? 
It can be summarized using three words: disproportion, disconnection, and inequality.
Disproportion, when George Pébereau, the former CEO of the Compagnie Générale 
d’Électricité, commenting on the remuneration of managers such as Philippe Jaffré, An-
toine Zacharias, Daniel Bernard, and Jean-Noel Forgeard, said that “they have provoked 
a feeling of revolt among white collar workers, who are incredulous at the unbelievable 
remuneration earned by top managers.”3 Disproportion again when a French trader liv-
ing in London explained that “None of my mates in École Polytechnique, even the one 
who is now at the head of a big automobile firm, could earn in a few years as much as I 
did: enough money to buy a flat in a capital city and a house on the seafront.” 4 Dispro-
portion when a paper stated that the CEO of Goldman Sachs earned 53 million dollars 
and that the total amount of bonuses paid in the City was 21 billion dollars.5 More dis-
proportion still when Le Monde picked up from the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that 
the six people at of the head of the Porsche automobile firm had received 143 million 
euros, half of that sum accruing to the CEO – an amount of money that the German 
newspaper translated into the extravagant hourly rate of 21,346 euros, provided that 
this economic superman worked 70 hours a week, 52 weeks a year.6 
Disconnection, when Le Monde mentioned that Patricia Russo, CEO of Alcatel, received 
a golden parachute worth 6 million euros, when over the previous eight years the firm 
had lost 95 percent of its share value.7 Disconnection again when the newspaper told its 
readers that 40 billion of the 700 billion dollars of the Paulson plan will be used to pay 
bankers’ bonuses.8 More disconnection still when the newspaper publicized the claim 
made by the former CEO of a large business bank buyout that he deserved a 10 million 
dollar bonus – 13 times his annual remuneration – because it was his prudent manage-
ment during the recent crisis that had succeeded in reducing losses for the owners.9
Inequality, when George Pébereau pointed out that wealth inequality was creating a 
revolutionary situation: “the discrepancy between wage earners and the small minority 
of the privileged, sheltered by political powers, is deepening to the point that the situ-
ation is now similar to the revolutionary situation in 1789.”10 Inequality again when 
a journalist pointed out: “Whereas the wages of 90 percent of the population have in-
creased slowly (4 percent) during the last eight years, the mean wage of the top 1 percent 
has benefitted from a 14 percent increase.”11 
3 Le Monde, September 17 (2008: 17).
4 Le Monde, September 21–22 (2008: 10).
5 Le Monde, October 19–20 (2008: 9).
6 Le Monde, December 1 (2008: 12).
7 Le Monde, September  3 (2008: 17).
8 Le Monde, November 6 (2008: 19).
9 Le Monde, December 10 (2008: 16).
10 Le Monde, September 17 (2008: 17).
11 Le Monde, October 25 (2008: 2).
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The situation was thus socially constructed in terms of moral outrage. Suddenly, eco-
nomic phenomena that had been either taken for granted or simply neglected aroused 
the contempt of journalists and the middle classes. New justifications had to be devised 
in order to answer those who were infuriated by the decoupling of performances and 
remuneration, and who claimed that a more equal distribution of earnings should be 
established. Market justifications provided by economists or those receiving those ob-
scene levels of remuneration faced a moral outcry, together with moral claims from 
those suffering from the economic misbehavior of those in receipt of substantial bo-
nuses. As Émile Durkheim wrote one century ago, the “law of supply and demand” no 
longer brought into alignment the moral evaluation of the services provided and the 
remuneration received; and whatever economists might think about it, “laypeople felt 
that it was unfair” (Durkheim [1897]1976: 226). The situation was thus typical of what 
may be called a moral economy, where economic actions and institutions are evaluated 
according to a moral point of view different from the one explicitly or implicitly em-
bedded in the prevailing economic discourse.
How is this moral economy structured? A brief comparison between two surveys – an 
older European one (ISSP 1999) and a French one from two years ago – makes salient 
four characteristics (see Table 1). 
First, the structure of income distribution remains largely unknown to the public. A 
majority of the people queried believes that this distribution has the shape of a pyra-
mid (a large number of poor forming the base, with a few wealthy people in the upper 
reaches), when the distribution has in fact the shape of a lozenge.
Second, in all countries, inequalities are considered by the public to be too great – less so in 
the United States (with 66 percent of the respondents agreeing with this statement), and 
more so in Europe (82, 86 and 89 percent, respectively, in Great Britain, France, and Spain).
Third, while wages and the hierarchy of wages are well known at the bottom of the pyra-
mid of the distribution, the remuneration received at the top is grossly underestimated. In 
1999, respondents underestimated the ratio between the wage of a worker and the remu-
neration of a CEO by a factor of 10; the underestimation was still of a factor of 5 in 2010.
Fourth, respondents were not egalitarian, since they limited their desired ratio to a re-
duction of estimated inequalities by a factor of 2 (this factor is somewhat larger in 
France: 3 in 1999 and 3.5 in 2010, as shown in Table 1). Respondents were not stub-
bornly attached to their previous views on the issue, since French data show how dra-
matic the change was in the desired ratio, which jumped upwards and increased the in-
come of a CEO from 6.3 times the unskilled worker’s wages to 18 times – about 22,000 
euros a month, according to the current minimum wage in France.
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Table 1 CEO‘s revenues to unskilled worker revenues ratio
Germany United States Great Britain France 2009 France 2010
Perceived ratio 8.0 12.5 12.5 16.0 63.0
Desired ratio 5.0 5.0 5.6 6.3 18.0
Data from International Social Survey Programme (1999) and GEMASS Survey (2010). See Forsé and 
Galland (2011: 268).
These characteristic features of the moral economy, engendered by the existence and 
persistence of obscene remunerations rewarding failure and cupidity, prompt some 
concluding comments.
Firstly, inequality does matter, as Joseph Stiglitz (2012) wrote in his last book. It matters 
because perceived inequality may have far-reaching consequences for the functioning of 
a democratic society, notably when a large majority of the people has the feeling that 
they cannot do anything to change the situation. The present low level of confidence in 
political leaders is, in France – but is this limited to France? –, related to what Stiglitz 
calls the government “of the 1 percent, for the 1 percent, by the 1 percent” (Stiglitz 2012: 
xi and chapter 9). In this sense, the rise of economic inequality which introduces a 
major cleavage between those who belong to the first percentile of the income distribu-
tion and the remainder of society (Piketty 2005; Piketty/Saez 2003) can be considered 
a form of social pollution, downgrading the quality of social life in the same way that 
chemical pollution downgrades the quality of the atmosphere or the water.
Secondly, moral economy is both weak and powerful. Weak because, as it is often said, 
morality is a soft power when confronted with hard economic or political issues. Fur-
thermore, the feeling of moral deprivation may lead to apathy rather than to politi-
cal strength, nationalistic and narrow-minded approaches rather than innovative ones. 
Powerful, because when connected to political forces, moral issues may become a lever 
to foster political change. The European Parliament’s recent decision to cap bonuses in 
the financial industry is a clear example of this power.
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The morality of rescuing banks  
Cornelia Woll
Trust in banks is at an all-time low. In most countries touched by the financial crisis, 
trust in the financial industry experienced a significant drop from 2008 to 2012. Ac-
cording to one recent survey, countries with traditionally high trust in banks, such as 
the US, saw confidence fall from 70 percent to 30 percent. In countries such as Ireland, 
trust in banks reached a record low of 6 percent (Edelmann Trust Barometer 2012).1 
Moral judgments about the role of banks in the financial crisis are close to unanimous. 
Banks are the culprits of the crisis, brought about by excessive risk-taking and expan-
sion for over a decade. The benefits of these risks constituted private gains. When things 
turned sour, excessive risks should have been shouldered by those who had benefitted. 
In the worst case, financial institutions should go bankrupt – the ultimate price to pay 
for unsound strategic choices. 
For the most part, this did not happen. Instead, governments everywhere rushed to 
support their banking sectors, committing considerable amounts of public money to 
ensure their stability. The categories used to describe these bank bailouts are unam-
biguous: criticizing the privatization of profits and the socialization of losses, Joseph 
Stiglitz has called the US bank bailout the “robbery of the American people” (Fenton/
Kan 2009). Others have commented that “capitalism without financial failure is not 
capitalism at all, but a kind of socialism for the rich” (Grant 2007). 
One of the core concepts in economics describes why government intervention to save 
the banking sector is a bad thing: it creates moral hazard. The normative valence is 
signaled by the term itself. It encapsulates the idea that misplaced incentives lead self-
interested individuals to rely on others for their own benefit, to “free-ride” on public 
insurance. 
Focusing on moral hazard has led many economists to criticize the bank rescue schemes 
in very strong terms. In an unusual alliance, they are joined by those opposed to market 
integration and finance more generally, who also vividly criticize bank support as an 
undue gift to the banking industry, another proof of the political power of a small frac-
tion of the economy, which has risen to dominate both society and politics. It is difficult 
not to agree with many of the accusations and hard to understand how anybody could 
defend committing public money to save the financial industry in times of crisis. 
Indeed those making arguments in support of the bank bailouts do this without any 
moral high ground. They underline the fact that the financial industry has become too 
connected and that the failure of one institution will risk damaging others – in many 
1 The Edelman Trust Barometer is a non-representative online survey. For a representative survey 
on trust that covers only Europe, see the Eurobarometer surveys. 
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cases so severely that the entire sector and possibly the economy as a whole will suffer 
substantially. Rescuing banks is not done for their own sake, but to avoid a situation 
that would be even worse and more costly, where the government would have to step in 
to ensure that firms and employees in the so-called real economy can continue having 
access to credit and work. Bailouts are thus simply lesser evils, but by no means desir-
able or sustainable. 
The difficulties that come with this weak moral standpoint were felt by politicians ev-
erywhere. All the governments that were in power at the outbreak of the banking crisis 
have been voted out of office. Stabilizing the economy and following the moral high 
ground appeared to have been in stark opposition. As current US Treasury Secretary 
Timothy Geithner puts it: “Old Testament justice would have prevented us from putting 
out the panic, getting growth back, making people feel more confident in the future.” As 
a result, he concludes “we saved the economy, but we lost the public doing it” (cited in 
Swedberg 2012: fn. 14). In many countries where bank bailouts imposed considerable 
costs on society, there is a sense of a deeply dysfunctional system of political representa-
tion and elite dominance. 
At the heart of the problem is a disconnect between moral categories, which apply to 
individual banks, enshrined in the notion of moral hazard, and public justifications for 
bank rescues, which center on a collective problem: systemic risk. Put differently, the 
identified moral problem – the behavior of individual banks – and the cited justification 
for government action – the stability of the financial sector – focus on different units of 
analysis and therefore inevitably create a tension. Politically, this can only be resolved 
if the diagnosis of the stakes and our moral categories are aligned. This means that we 
need to think about the collective moral responsibilities of the financial industry. 
Many governments attempted to impose such collective responsibilities on the financial 
industry during the bailout discussions in the autumn of 2008. In the weekend negotia-
tions over the fall of Lehman Brothers, the US government assembled the CEOs of the 
major financial institutions and asked them to come up with a private sector solution, 
insisting with reference to the support given to Bear Stearns that “we have done the last 
one, you are doing this one” (Wessel 2010: 16). The German government repeatedly 
asked the heads of the major banking associations and the principal financial institu-
tions to put together a collective support mechanism for struggling banks. In France, 
Denmark, and Austria, government and financial representatives worked towards a pri-
vate sector solution with public backing to ensure continued liquidity.  
In most cases, however, the collective support schemes failed to materialize. One leader 
of the American financial industry responded incredulously: “We are responsible for 
our own balance sheets, and now we need to be responsible for others?” (cited in Paul-
son 2011: 198). The size of the aid needed went far beyond what individual banks were 
able to support, given that they all had similar difficulties at the time. Even in countries 
where the financial industry contributed collectively, such as France, Denmark, or Aus-
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tria, the government needed to step in and complement this action through guaran-
tees and additional measures. When collective action by the financial industry did not 
come about, the government stepped in to pick up the bill. In most cases, collective 
action from the financial industry failed, and this explains the disproportionate part 
of the costs borne by taxpayers. This failure of collective solutions, however, has been 
discussed much less than the incentive structures that had led to the risky behavior of 
individual banks prior to the crisis.
The implication of my diagnosis for the future of bank regulation and support schemes 
is that we need more, rather than less, political involvement on the part of the financial 
industry. This is a rather surprising conclusion, since a chorus of critics has warned that 
finance has undue political influence. I argue that financial institutions have held many 
strong individual ties with their governments, but insufficient ties with each other in 
most countries. In his latest book, American sociologist Mark Mizruchi (2013) analyzes 
this from a network perspective for the US corporate elite more generally. Showing how 
corporate leaders have succeeded in pushing back constraints imposed by labor and 
government, while simultaneously being exposed to an ever more short-termist share-
holder capitalism, Mizruchi argues that the American business elite today is fragmented 
and no longer seeks to contribute to social and political issues as it has in the past. Ac-
celerated by the decline of commercial banks, whose boardrooms served as meeting 
places for the American company networks, business elites have abandoned long-term 
political initiatives and now concentrate on the short-term interests of their own firms. 
During the crisis management in 2008, the great majority of financial elites defended 
a similar position: unwilling or unable to engage in industry-wide commitments, they 
insisted on their firms’ interests only. Given the structural dependence public authori-
ties have on finance, this inaction was an invisible way of exerting power (Woll 2013). 
In cases where the political authority faces systemic risks, the winning strategy for the 
financial industry could be called “staying divided to conquer.” 2
Analyzing inaction in terms of power, as I have done here, is in itself a political exercise. 
It implies that a viable alternative existed or should have been probed (Guzzini 2005). 
In doing so, I try to outline what moral debates have not yet taken place, because the 
political space was occupied with moral hazard considerations and the reprimanding 
of public authorities accused of being captured by the financial industry. It leaves in the 
dark the collective responsibilities of the industries in the moment of crisis.
Financial regulation to prevent a future crisis should not only concentrate on moral 
hazard issues and the incentive structures for individual institutions, which is done 
very usefully through discussion about bail-in mechanisms and the nature of resolution 
regimes for failing banks. It also needs to acknowledge the systemic nature of collective 
interdependence and build privately financed mechanisms to respond to a downturn 
2 I thank Daniel Mügge for this expression.
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collectively. A bank levy that funds a collective insurance scheme is one way forward, 
and needs to be complemented by mutual surveillance mechanisms between financial 
institutions that curb free-riding. 
During the last 20 years, all of the nearly 100 banking crises that have occurred inter-
nationally were resolved through bailouts at the taxpayer’s expense. Rather than simply 
declaring bailouts as the moral failure of banks, and later of politicians, we should draw 
the lessons from these experiences and work towards public arrangements that require 
financial institutions to contribute to their own rescue. This can only be done prior to 
a crisis, and implies that we translate the benefits they reap from interdependence into 
public obligations to protect against system risk. We need to build regulatory arrange-
ments that engage the financial industry as a collective, where their enlightened self-
interest can direct them towards maintaining the stability of the economy.
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The construction of a moral duty for the Greek people to repay  
their national debt1
Wolfgang Streeck
Debt must be repaid in full, as a moral principle in everyday life. I owe my neighbor who 
has helped me out not to let him down. Today, public discourse in Europe applies the 
duty to repay to entire nations, conceived as moral communities: “Greece” must repay 
“its” debt, even though most Greeks have never seen an investment bank from the inside. 
The reason why Greek citizens are supposed to be responsible for the debt incurred by 
their governments and their central bank is that their country is, allegedly, a democracy. 
“No taxation without representation” is reinterpreted to mean: “With representation, 
full liability.” Greek citizens are made liable regardless of whether they have voted for 
the governments that have indebted them, or whether they have voted at all, or whether 
they have ever benefited from the debt. Such is the magic of representative democracy.
Remarkably, the task of selecting the Greek citizens who are to be made to pay for 
“Greece’s” collective debt is left to a government run by the very same parties that piled 
up the debt in the first place.2 Given the size of the debt, the ministers and central bank-
ers who incurred it cannot possibly repay it personally, comfortable as their salaries, 
savings, and inherited wealth may be.3 To the extent that they still hold public office, 
they have the privilege to declare repayment the moral duty of the pensioners, patients, 
civil servants, and workers of Greece, who are called upon to help out their country by 
helping its out creditors.4 
1 Dedicated to the sociologist Émile Durkheim, who has taught us the difference between just 
and unjust contracts, and to the anarchist David Graeber, for reminding us of the social mean-
ing of credit and debt.
2 From 1989 on, the two major political parties, Nea Demokratia and PASOK, have taken turns in 
the Greek Prime Minister’s office. The present Prime Minister, Antonis Samaras (in office since 
June 2012) is the leader of Nea Demokratia and governs in a Grand Coalition with PASOK. In 
1989, he was Minister of Finance; in the 1990s, he served as Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
3 Not to mention their kleptocratic wealth. See The New York Times, January 5, 2013, on the for-
mer Greek finance minister, Papaconstantinou, and his family, among them a cousin who runs, 
of all things, the country’s privatization agency.
4 And help they did. On average, gross household disposable income declined by 13 percent from 
2008 to 2011. By that year, 30 percent of Greece’s population was at risk of poverty (Directorate-
General for Employment 2012). Unemployment, meanwhile, approached 30 percent by the end 
of 2012, and was nearly 50 percent for young people. By June 2012, salaries in the private and 
public sectors had been cut by up to 50 percent, and under a deal with the “Troika,” 150,000 
public sector jobs were to be eliminated within a year’s time. On the catastrophic condition of 
the Greek health care system after years of Troika governance, see The New York Times, Decem-
ber 26, 2011, “Fiscal Crisis Takes Toll on Greeks,” www.nytimes.com/2011/12/27/world/europe/
greeks-reeling-from-health-care-cutbacks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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However, neither the capital market nor international politics are a traditional Chinese 
family, with its unquestionable moral duty for a nephew to repay a loan from his uncle 
in full, at whatever cost. The morality of a financial market, just like that of interna-
tional relations, is based on difference, not on identity, and it is therefore regulated by 
law rather than paternal authority.
In commercial life, a debtor who has become insolvent may initiate legal proceedings 
to have his debt “restructured,” or even canceled. Liability is often limited to capital 
invested, protecting private wealth. Creditors are expected to make themselves knowl-
edgeable about the risk of a debtor being unable to service his debt, and adjust the rate 
of interest they demand accordingly (i.e., ask for an adequate “risk premium” under the 
principle of caveat emptor). It is said that in the US, having gone bankrupt once or twice 
is nothing to be ashamed of, as it indicates a spirit of daring entrepreneurship.
In most civil law systems, there is a limit to the seizure of property or income to repay 
outstanding debt, ensuring that private bankruptcy does not result in abject poverty. In 
Germany, for example, citizens who go bankrupt are allowed to keep roughly 2,000 eu-
ros a month of their income, to enable them to fulfill family obligations and continue to 
participate in social life. Courts cannot impound a person’s television set, and debtors 
must remain able to pay for health care and even set aside savings for their old age.
Moreover, purveyors of credit are legally obliged to provide customers with truthful 
information about the nature of the loans they offer – in particular, their true cost. 
Creditors who have not been properly advised can sue for damages. There may even 
be criminal penalties for withholding important information from customers. (Did 
Greek politicians and central bankers fully inform their fellow citizens about the risks 
associated with the cheap credit they started taking up in their name upon entry into 
the Monetary Union?)
Furthermore, under international law, sovereign countries can unilaterally cancel their 
debt or apply a “haircut” to their creditors at their discretion. The ability to default at 
will is an essential element of national sovereignty, and of course providers of credit to 
governments know this. Behind this policy is the principle that countries are obligated 
first to their citizens and only then to other countries or to international organizations 
and the “financial markets.” The moral language of the European financial crisis today 
is designed to repress the memory of this fundamental condition, so that the “financial 
industry” and the governments of lender countries can be safe. Banks and economically 
16 MaxPo Discussion Paper 13/1
leading nation-states are together framing the crisis in a way that makes it the moral 
duty of a state to apply a haircut – should one become necessary – to its citizens rather 
than to its creditors. 
Astonishingly, this moral construction is hardly ever questioned, although an alterna-
tive story would seem to be readily available. Its starting point would be the co-respon-
sibility of the creditor for the failure of the debtor: the obligation not to make loans to 
borrowers who will most likely not be able to repay them. In the United States, this ob-
ligation is at the center of a vast number of cases making their way through the courts 
against reckless providers of subprime mortgages. Similar principles may be invoked if 
a barman keeps serving double whiskies to a customer who is already drunk, and then 
lets him drive home in his car.
The official version of the Greek national debt morality play must be all the more 
welcome to Greece’s creditors given the history of Greek indebtedness, a history that 
is much more complex and includes many more villains than the current “repay thy 
neighbor” rhetoric suggests:
1.  Before the advent of the euro, Greece, like Spain and Portugal, received considerable 
amounts of cash every year from the European Union, allegedly to help the country 
“develop.”5 It is questionable, however, to what extent European aid did, in fact, serve 
that purpose, and indeed whether anyone cared about it. What it undoubtedly did 
do was to stabilize the Western European orientation of Greek political elites, re-
warding them for rejecting both military dictatorship and Eurocommunism in the 
1970s and 1980s. The “clientelism” of the two main Greek political parties in the last 
two decades of the twentieth century was, to an important extent, funded by Euro-
pean regional and structural development funds.
2.  Cash transfers to Greece (and to Spain and Portugal as well) were frozen in the late 
1990s, in the course of efforts by the rich countries to consolidate their public fi-
nances, as well as in response to the need to extend financial assistance to Eastern 
Europe after the end of Communism. Admission to the Monetary Union had the 
welcome side effect that it enabled Mediterranean countries to borrow money in in-
ternational financial markets at roughly Western European rates, replacing transfers 
from national treasuries with credit from international banks. In effect, this was the 
international equivalent of the “privatized Keynesianism” (Crouch 2009) of the time 
in the domestic political economies of countries like the US and the UK.
3.  The European Union was acutely aware of the need to give Greece and the other 
Mediterranean countries access to cheap credit in lieu of fiscal transfers. As the Mon-
etary Union started, the Commission – in the person of the Commissioner in charge 
5 Between 1995 and 1998, Greece received yearly subsidies from the European Union that 
amounted to roughly 4 percent of its gross domestic product.
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of financial services, Mario Monti – ruled that public debt from member states could 
be used indistinctly by banks as collateral for loan transactions (Gabor/Ban 2012). 
This caused a run on state papers and led to a rapid convergence of risk premiums 
among EMU countries. It enabled Greece in particular to indebt itself at a previously 
unknown pace, without its interest payments skyrocketing (Figure 1).6
4.  The need for Greece to take up credit resulted not least from its truly Byzantine tax 
regime. The media like to point to widespread tax evasion among the working and 
middle classes, which fits in with the rhetoric holding them morally responsible for 
paying off the national debt on behalf of Greece as a whole. It is remarkable, however, 
that the European Union never tried to make Greece rescind the constitutional tax 
privileges of the Orthodox Church7 or of Greek shipowners.8 Nor did the European 
Commission object when Greece, immediately upon its admission to the EMU, cut 
the top rate of its corporate tax from 40 to 20 percent (Markantonatou 2012), re-
placing revenue foregone with cheap credit.9 Tax competition is deeply written into 
the fabric of the Single Market and the European Union generally; it is considered 
economically healthy, especially for the higher-taxation countries in the North and 
West, whose tax regimes are in this way put under pressure. 
5.  In order for Greece to formally meet the criteria for admission to the EMU, it had to 
engage in creative accounting, for which it needed the assistance of that bank-of-all-
banks, Goldman Sachs. It is now known that Goldman made an extraordinary profit 
6 The two vertical bars indicate the years of Greece’s entry into the EMU and the onset of the 
Great Recession, respectively. The right-hand axis measures government debt in percent of 
GDP; all other variables are measured by the left-hand axis.
7 See The Guardian Weekly, October 4, 2011: “The Greek church and its monasteries will not have 
to pay the deeply unpopular property tax that the government introduced in September in an 
effort to fulfill Greece’s austerity targets. ‘The church will be taxed on any assets used for busi-
ness purposes,’ a finance ministry spokesman said after news of the tax caused an outcry. Places 
of worship and charitable organizations will be exempt from the tax. But the borderline is fuzzy 
and the accounts of the Orthodox church are opaque ...” For details, see www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2011/oct/04/greece-orthodox-church-economic-crisis.
8 See Ekathimerini, June 12, 2012: “Greek ship owners who remitted more than $175 billion in 
untaxed earnings to the country in 10 years say they would relocate the businesses if a new 
government scraps the fiscal exemption, risking as many as 60,000 jobs. The country’s es-
timated 762 vessel owners pay no tax on international earnings brought into Greece under 
rules incorporated in the country’s constitution since 1967. The SYRIZA party, which opposes 
Greece’s international bailout and is shown by polls as vying for first place before a June 17 
election, says it wants to abolish the tax break.” www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_
wsite2_1_12/06/2012_ 446527. The 1967 constitution was imposed by the military dictatorship. 
In 1972, the dictator, General Papadopoulos, was made Lifetime Honorary President of the 
Greek Shipowners Association (Markantonatou 2012).
9 Both transfers from EU structural funds and low-interest loans after Monetary Union may rea-
sonably be described as subsidies made by Western European countries for an oligarchic tax 
regime in an effort to secure social peace on their Mediterranean glacis, by sparing a country 
like Greece from the need to revolutionize an archaic social structure. 
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on that operation.10 What is not yet well-known enough, however, is the fact that the 
President of the Greek central bank at this time was one Lukas Papademos, who a 
few years later advanced to the position of Vice President of the ECB, and from there 
to that of Prime Minister of Greece, appointed by international capital markets to 
secure the repayment of Greek’s debt to its creditors. Nor is it sufficiently known 
that when Greece’s entry into the EMU was made possible, Mario Draghi was wait-
ing in the wings to become European chief of Goldman Sachs. Thereafter, in rapid 
succession, he became Governor of the Banca d’Italia – which includes membership 
in the governing body of the ECB – and then President of the ECB. It is completely 
inconceivable that Papademos and Draghi and their ilk should not have been aware 
of the way in which the Greek government of the time made use of their country’s 
membership in the EMU to replace both domestic taxes and international fiscal sub-
sidies with cheap credit from, among others, Goldman Sachs.
6.  Another aspect of the Greek tragedy is the fact that rampant capital flight from 
Greece remained and remains entirely unchecked at both the national and the Eu-
ropean levels. Newspapers have again and again written about the vast amounts of 
Greek money that are flowing into the real estate markets of cities such as London,11 
Paris and Berlin, greatly benefiting local owners of luxury houses and apartments. 
This is another result of the lifting of capital controls in the 1990s and thereafter, 
which was part and parcel of the Internal Market and, in particular, the Monetary 
Union. Never have the European Union or its leading member states suggested to 
the Greek government that it limit transactions of this sort, nor have they suggested 
that member governments tax Greek real estate investment abroad as an act of “Eu-
ropean solidarity” (Grözinger 2012). 
The moral discourse on Greek public finances focuses on “the Greek citizens” and their 
presumed duty to pay off debt taken up by their past governments, supposedly to enable 
their voters to enjoy an easy life on unearned income. It aims primarily at pensioners 
10 See Bloomberg, March 6, 2012, “Goldman Secret Greece Loan Shows Two Sinners as Client Un-
ravels.” The article begins as follows: “Greece’s secret loan from Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) 
was a costly mistake from the start. On the day the 2001 deal was struck, the government owed 
the bank about 600 million euros ($793 million) more than the 2.8 billion euros it borrowed, 
said Spyros Papanikolaou, who took over the country’s debt-management agency in 2005. By 
then, the price of the transaction, a derivative that disguised the loan and that Goldman Sachs 
persuaded Greece not to test with competitors, had almost doubled to 5.1 billion euros ...”
11 See The Guardian, April 13, 2010: “Greeks taking fright at the fiscal crisis … are snapping up 
properties in Britain as part of a desperate flight of capital. … Prime real estate in London, the 
traditional home of Greece’s wealthy shipping community, is being bought at an unprecedented 
rate by rich Greeks desperate to transfer their bank deposits. The land grab has astounded estate 
agents, with many referring to the new homebuyers as ‘cash Greeks’ because of their willing-
ness to part with large sums of money in record time to secure £1m-plus properties. ‘They are 
all cash buyers, serious players who are only interested in the high-end market around Regent’s 
Park, Mayfair and Marylebone,’ said Panos Koutsoyiannakis at the central London estate agents 
Fraser & Co.” www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/apr/13/greek-debt-crisis-capital-outflow.
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and workers, in both the private and the public sectors, and functions as a deplorably 
successful ideological tool wielded by the “market forces” and their bureaucratic-polit-
ical running dogs, in Greece as well as in Brussels and Washington. The aim is to suck 
the Greek people dry and strip them of everything they may have gained for themselves 
in three decades of democracy. I am convinced that the story does not end here and that 
Greece is no more than a testing ground for the same treatment to be applied to other 
European countries. The personnel to perform the sucking are already in place, while 
the instruments are being continuously refined in the Greek operating theater. 
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The economy as morality play, and implications for the Eurozone crisis
Marion Fourcade
The economy is always and everywhere the theater of a morality play, where moral 
worth is being negotiated alongside economic worth. People interpret differential re-
wards in the economy both as a “functional requirement” and as a “normative impera-
tive” flowing from equity considerations: those who put in more work should be com-
pensated (Sachweh 2012). Even when routinely contradicted by the reality of social 
inequalities, this moral belief is so strong that those who find themselves at the bottom 
of the economic scale, or in a situation of financial distress, are often suspected of low 
effort, innate mediocrity or moral weakness. Always in want of money, but never trust-
ed with it, the poor in particular are the object of enormous suspicion, which seems to 
justify special controls and obligations.1 Moral hierarchies are brought into alignment 
with economic hierarchies through the frequent and ordinary “shaming of those who 
fail” (Sayer 2005: 959): large and small acts of contempt, obliviousness, condescension, 
disrespect and coercion waged in everyday life as well as through the operation of in-
stitutions that deploy considerable resources and ingenuity to tell the “deserving” apart 
from the “undeserving.”2
Conversely, the position of the economically powerful is, at least partly, naturalized as 
the outcome of merit, talent, or moral strength. Further symbolic qualification may 
come in the form of self-confidence, bodily appearance and hexis, linguistic and social 
skills, and cultural capital. Embodied dispositions and attributes operate as resources 
that anchor social hierarchies and make them more legitimate – not only in the eyes 
of the dominant, but in those of the dominated as well. This is, quite simply, what 
Pierre Bourdieu (1984) called symbolic violence. To be sure, rich individuals may elicit 
animosity and contempt as well, particularly when they are perceived as haughty and 
distant (see, e.g., Prasad et al. 2009), or abusing their power, or having inherited – rather 
than earned – their wealth (Beckert 2008). But the asymmetry remains: the social psy-
chology literature has documented time and again that even young children learn early 
on to make much more positive attributions about the “moral character” of the rich vs. 
the poor (Skafte 1989). 
1 Piven and Cloward (1972), for instance, have described the insidious surveillance strategies 
developed by welfare officials to make sure recipients of public assistance programs really de-
served help. 
2 Much research suggests that the cultural boundary between the “deserving” and the “undeserv-
ing” is strengthened through racial or ethnic stigmatization. Thus the weakness of solidaristic 
feelings and institutions in the United States has often been related to the country’s brutal racial 
history, which has resulted in the seemingly intractable situation of a large black underclass 
(Feagin 1975; Quadagno 1996; Lamont 2000). In Europe, weakening support for the welfare 
state has also been understood as a byproduct of negative attitudes toward immigrants (Senik/
Stichnoth/Van der Straeten 2009; Eger 2010). 
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Hierarchy and debt
Economic transactions and interactions are a powerful vehicle for the crystallization of 
moral categories precisely because they are a key mechanism through which individuals 
and human collectives obtain or are recognized in positions in the social structure. But 
nowhere is the entanglement between social position, economic worth and moral worth 
more obvious than in the case of debt, where the economic standing and character of 
borrowers are simultaneously constituted as the precondition for the economic rela-
tionship and as its essential stake. Thus Max Weber (1978) saw the distinction between 
debtors and creditors as a primordial principle of social differentiation and a point 
of origin for the constitution of “economic classes”: that distinction structured soci-
ety into groups with unequal economic trajectories. But it also differentiated between 
people of unequal moral worth. To be sure, lending was always a morally suspicious 
business, and it was stigmatized accordingly throughout history. In a fully developed 
credit economy, where lenders are large and impersonal, however, the moral burden 
of the relationship falls disproportionately on the shoulders of the borrower. As David 
Graeber (2010: 120) puts it, 
During the time that the debt remains unpaid, the logic of hierarchy takes hold ... But always 
there is the assumption that the situation is somewhat unnatural, because the debt really ought 
to be paid. This is what makes situations of effectively unpayable debt so difficult and painful. 
Since creditor and debtor are ultimately equals, if the debtor cannot do what it takes to restore 
herself to equality, there is obviously something wrong with her. 
And thus a bad debtor will be punished through the very instruments of her sin:  hav-
ing lost her “credit,” she will find that money is more expensive now, or more difficult 
to obtain altogether.
Just as there is an economic and moral ordering among people, there is an economic 
and moral ordering among nation-states. Debt stands at the core of this as well. Insist-
ing that money is owed – in the form of tributes, reparations and the fulfillment of 
contractual obligations – is the way in which political entities have historically asserted 
their superiority against vulnerable others, be they defeated enemies, rebellious colo-
nies, or simply weaker economic partners. 
Tough love
Since the widespread institutionalization of sovereign (government) debt in the 1800s, 
the economic position of political entities known as states is translated through the 
conditions this debt faces on international financial markets. The price of a country’s 
sovereign debt (the interest rates its bonds command on these markets) appears as an 
objectified measure of some sort of underlying moral worth in the eyes of investors, en-
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capsulating the country’s ability and willingness to repay. Because these evaluations are 
both hard to pin down and highly speculative, however, variations in the terms of credit 
faced by states may be extremely brutal, driven by rapid swings in collective sentiment 
as much as by changes in fundamentals (see, for instance, the 2009 unhinging of inter-
est rates on Greek debt in Wolfgang Streeck’s article in this symposium). Thus, nations 
may find themselves in the situation of being all but priced out of private financing (in 
other words, the risk premium is so high they cannot borrow anymore). This is when 
the institutions of last resort intervene, the International Monetary Fund first among 
them. With the crisis in the Eurozone, the European Union and more recently, the Eu-
ropean Central Bank, have also stepped in. But with such interventions, the nature of 
the moral regulation changes. Instead of the mechanical disciplining of the market (in 
the form of country credit ratings, the up and down movements of the interest rate on 
sovereign debt bonds, and the price of insurance for these bonds – or sovereign credit 
default swaps), an alternative arsenal may now be rolled out in exchange for afford-
able credit, with conditionality and surveillance at its core. As The Guardian recently 
phrased it, “you could think of the IMF as a global payday loan company for countries 
who have got into trouble and can’t meet their financial commitments – the difference 
being that instead of charging sky-high interest rates, it demands radical economic re-
forms” (Aitkenhead 2012).
The analogy between individuals and nations is tricky, however. First, countries – unlike 
individuals – technically have the capacity to tax their population so that government 
debt, unlike individual debt, is supposedly much less risky. This, however, is mitigated 
by the fact that countries default on their debt all the time, and have been doing so 
for over two centuries (Reinhart/Rogoff 2009). Second, the rating process is opaque, 
shrouded in mystery and behind-the-scenes politics: against the mechanical objectivity 
of the technologies of individual credit (especially scoring), country ratings come in the 
form of much less precise categorical statements (letter grades) rather than numerical 
scores. Third, it is materially straightforward to hold individuals accountable for debts 
they have contracted. But the moral responsibility of a country’s political leaders, let 
alone its banks, is not easily fungible into the moral responsibility of its citizenry. So the 
lenders of last resort are faced with a moral dilemma: politicizing blame (by targeting 
governments or private entities) or nationalizing it (by encompassing national com-
munities). Often, the line between the two is very hard to tread.
The conditional “helping hand” of the IMF interacts with political entities with a mix-
ture of coercion and training (“tough love” in the words of Christine Lagarde, the cur-
rent [2013] head of the institution). As such, it is a deeply corrective mechanism, with 
inescapable moral effects. Aimed at governments, programs have an unmistakable civi-
lizational purpose – conditionality is a cultural, inherently modernist project to train, 
educate, and profoundly reform those societies whose poor performance has exposed 
them as inadequate, insufficient, incompetent, and shackled by outdated institutions 
inimical to the flourishing of modern capitalism. Experts, including from our own 
ranks, have their own vocabulary to designate the typical flaws: rampant “corruption,” 
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low “state capacity,” poor “governance,” “rigidities” of all sorts, and “inefficient” policies. 
The more troubled the country, the longer the road to travel and the tougher the condi-
tions: in part, this is because conditionality is the translation, in economic terms, of a 
perceived civilizational distance as well as, certainly, of a real power distance. 
There is no escaping the collective nature of this form of discipline. A country’s fall out 
of favor on international markets is a profoundly meaningful event in its citizens’ lives. 
And this is not simply because nearly everyone’s material situation is affected by its 
ramifications. To be sure, people are being economically downgraded: if the currency is 
devalued (as would surely happen if a country were to exit the Eurozone), standards of 
living will sink instantly; even in the absence of a devaluation, the lost margin of ma-
neuver in the face of high borrowing costs and the stringent demands of the “helping 
hands” on the fiscal front will force many states into austerity, as has been the case in 
Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain. Thus, the intermediary classes in Southern Europe, 
which were the major beneficiaries of the short-lived moment of economic conver-
gence, cosmopolitanism, and Euro-optimism before 2008, have suddenly found them-
selves thrown back in time – not only to bleaker economic perspectives, but also back to 
the confines of their nationality and its supposed backwardness. 
Spoiled identities
But there are other consequences. As the perspective of convergence across Eurozone 
economies recedes on both the financial and the real economy fronts,3 it has been re-
placed by the notion of an unbridgeable cultural gap between the North and the South, 
which is skillfully exploited by Eurosceptics of all stripes. So the economically vulnerable 
also face a form of moral downgrading, which may take different forms. First, through 
the fusion and confusion of economic moralities between the individual and collective 
levels, the average citizen of the forsaken countries is emblematically represented in the 
critics’ discourse as a fool, a tax evader, an imprudent borrower, or a freeloader enabled 
by a much too lavish state. The moral violence of such symbolic markers leaves no one 
undisturbed, and thus stigmatized citizens will emphatically deny them, resent them, 
and sometimes own up to them in an anxious search for absolution.
Second, the crisis-ridden countries of the Eurozone have found themselves lumped col-
lectively into one wholesome flawed category. This moral sinkhole absorbs and blends 
them together,4 in spite of the fact that they may have very different crisis etiologies. 
Southern European countries, for instance, were nicknamed PIGS (for Portugal, Italy, 
Greece, Spain) in the UK press in 2007. (They were the “Club Med” countries before 
that.) In 2008, the epithet was made more shrill-sounding with the addition of another 
3 See, e.g., Atkins (2012).
4 See Eyal (2010) for the concept of “moral blender.”
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I for Ireland – PIIGS. This amalgamation may, in some cases, relieve the moral burden 
of individual countries by mutualizing it: thus, a citizen from Greece might find some 
comfort in thinking “we’re not the only ones.” But this kind of commonality isn’t neces-
sarily reciprocated or valued across the board, so solidarity hasn’t really emerged within 
Southern Europe. For the most part, the moral sinkhole has fueled centrifugal tenden-
cies as people and governments have been striving to distance themselves from those in 
countries not (really) like them. Spain’s desperate efforts to avoid a European Stability 
Mechanism/IMF program are all about avoiding the stigma of being lumped together 
in the same category as Greece. 
Third, unlike the many nations, such as Argentina, that have been externally disciplined 
in the past, the Eurozone morality play has been performed by democratically elected 
governments with the backing, if not the active encouragement, of a large segment of their 
populations. Individuals and politicians in the morally downgraded countries have to 
see themselves through the looking-glass of a collective, pan-European (by and large a 
pan-Northern European) stigma of incapacity and illegitimacy – not through the eso-
teric pronouncements of a remote and widely unpopular institution (the IMF). This 
is real, intersubjective stigma elevated to the international stage. Their identity spoiled, 
contrite elites and populations are expected to “manage” it properly, which in the soci-
ology of Erving Goffman (1963) essentially means that they have to quietly “accept” the 
implicitly inferior status ascribed to them. 
Moral struggles
In the Portuguese and Irish cases, a silent form of heroic self-constraint has indeed pre-
vailed, where each country has voluntarily engaged in a desperate and very costly race 
for economic virtue (so far: opposition to this strategy is mounting fast at the time of 
this writing, particularly in Portugal).5 In the Greek case, however, the process has been 
much more brutal, externally-driven and infantilizing, perhaps because the moral vio-
lation (the cooked national books, the tax evasion) was perceived to be more egregious 
in the first place. As a result, the divides between the nation and its outside, between the 
complying government and the defiant population, between the taxed and the untaxed, 
between public and private employees, have been thrown into sharp relief, with each 
side projecting the moral responsibility for the fiscal mess onto the other. Thus, rebel-
lion and civic strife have set in.6 
5 The same painful processes even extend outside the Eurozone – for instance in would-be mem-
ber Latvia, deeply anxious to avoid falling back into the Russian orbit, and eager to demonstrate 
its European moral worthiness by tightening its belt.
6 Italy, likewise, was mostly defiant – and ungovernable – at the time of this writing, with populist 
movements riding on a wave of anti-German sentiment.  
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As the recent creation of an anti-euro party in Germany attests, the dominant countries 
are not left untouched by these centrifugal forces: they, too, split over the possibility of 
greater pan-European solidarity, all the more since they are the main targets of public 
resentment by those populations on the losing side of the Eurozone. Perhaps the ques-
tion of whether the cures proposed are economically effective or normatively justifiable 
is beyond the reach of this short piece. But pointing out the political importance of the 
moral-economic mechanics at work is not. These exhausting struggles provoke and 
nourish deep emotions, fuel nationalistic feelings, and heighten boundaries with the 
outside, especially where foreign advisers and managers step in. These sentiments are 
hardened by the preexisting nature of national or regional bonds, and they revive long 
and ugly histories of international relations. These revivals have already brought about 
reverse moral struggles – from Greece toward Germany in particular – over debts long 
past and moral obligations inherited from a time Europe had worked so hard to bury 
and forget. 
The energy generated by these emotions, and the social devastation that has accompa-
nied the crisis management process so far, have also driven attempts to assert or reclaim 
the high moral ground – mainly through politics – of a more peaceful or more violent 
sort. These attempts include the rise of xenophobia, centrifugal forces brewing in Spain 
and Belgium, and the vocal opposition to expand the European federalist project into 
fiscal territory. The possible implosion of some states under the pressure of economic 
austerity raises the specter of a Europe of the pick-and-choosers, just the opposite of 
the great hopes that had nourished the European project at its birth. And the sacrifice of 
large and young fractions of the population on the altar of the moral responsibility to 
repay a debt most of them did not contract tragically feeds into a political radicalization 
that may estrange them further from the targets of their resentment. 
These moral struggles and the different paths they inspire are not a distraction from 
some “real” economic issues beneath. They stand at the economy’s core and at the heart 
of the Eurozone’s future – and with it, the future of Europe. 
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